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ABSTRACT
How does environmental uncertainty affect the process of starting new
hybrid organizations? Our comparative analysis of the formation of two
“green” banks ! with hybrid goals linked to banking and environmental
logics ! reveals that shifts in their strategic orientations resulted from
attempts to align uncertain and changing resource environments with the
composition and goals of the organizations’ top leadership. While the ini-
tial idea and goals of the founders were similar, the organizations they
established ended up with divergent strategic orientations and senior
leadership groups.
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INTRODUCTION
How are the strategies of new organizations shaped by the institutional
environments in which they emerge? Institutions grant legitimacy to organi-
zations that follow established organizational forms, thereby facilitating
access to resources needed to support their strategies (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994;
Suchman, 1995). New organizations’ strategies are also shaped by local insti-
tutional logics that provide order and meaning to organizational activities
(Friedland, & Alford, 1991; Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012), and by
other market, regulative, social, and cultural factors (Marquis & Battilana,
2009). These diverse pressures provide a new organization with templates for
action, generally resulting in conformity with established organizational forms
present in their institutional environments (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).
Institutions thus benefit new organizations by facilitating their alignment
with established organizational fields. However, these same institutional
pressures may be antagonistic to organizations attempting to engage in
innovative entrepreneurship that diverges from institutional norms. Such
organizations frequently adopt innovative hybrid models of organizing that
require new combinations of cultural and material resources, and thus are
exposed to disparate and changing institutional pressures (Kraatz & Block,
2008). Previous research has noted that such organizations tend to operate at
the fringes of stable resource niches, where access to resources is risky and
unpredictable (Haveman & Rao, 2006). By pursuing strategies that require
diverse resources, these organizations open themselves to multiple, variable,
and discordant demands, to which established templates provide no viable
response (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011).
Innovative hybrid organizations thus confront a particular type of environ-
mental uncertainty associated with changing and competing institutional
pressures. Previous research on the emergence of organizations often assumes
that the local resource environment occupied by a given organization is rela-
tively well-defined and consistent. However, environmental instability and
ambiguity is an integral aspect of the organizational founding process, partic-
ularly for organizations that deviate from established organizational forms
(Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Suchman, 1995). Such organizations are prone to
search across discontinuous resource environments before settling on a stable
organizational strategy (Battilana & Dorado, 2010), and thus face uncertainty
in the very definition and scope of the resource environment they occupy.
The environmental fluidity faced by these new ventures resembles the concep-
tualization by entrepreneurship scholars of uncertainty as an “unknown
unknown” which defies evaluation ! distinct from measurable uncertainty
32 JUAN ALMANDOZ ET AL.
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(Knight, 1921; McMullen & Shepherd, 2006) ! because the institutional envi-
ronment with which the organization must contend is ambiguous ex ante. If
such environmental uncertainty is an essential feature of new organizations
that deviate from established forms, its consequences are important to under-
stand, because environmental influences at the time of founding are likely to
persist over time (Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013; Stinchcombe, 1965). Thus, we ask:
how does uncertainty in the environment of a divergent, innovative organiza-
tion influence its strategic orientation?
To address this question, we explore the co-emergent process of an organi-
zation’s strategic orientation and the internal representation of institutions
among its senior leadership. Senior leaders profoundly influence the fates of
organizations through their consideration and selection of organizational
strategies (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009), as well as by facilitating
relationships with their organizations’ external environments. Organizations
typically select leaders that align with their external environments, and thereby
represent external pressures in decision-making. For new, divergent organiza-
tions, however, this selection process is subject to environmental uncertainty.
As new organizations emerge, ‘leaders of these organizations may thus be
selected according to multiple and uncertain external pressures (Greve, 2008),
which will influence those leaders’ future decisions. Since each decision of
those senior leaders is influenced by preceding choices, the sequence in which
different parts of the environment receive the leaders’ attention are likely to
have important consequences for the organizations’ ultimate strategic orienta-
tion (David, 1994).
We examine these issues through a comparative case study of the creation
of two of the first “green banks” in the United States. Both were founded in
the first decade after the year 2000, one in a Western state and one in a
Southern state. The goals of the founders in creating these novel organizations
were both to make money and to support the well-being of the natural envi-
ronment. These goals were aligned, respectively, with standards and practices
taken from the banking sector and also from the field of “green” environmen-
tal sustainability organizations. Both green banks were thus founded as
hybrid organizations, influenced simultaneously by multiple resource environ-
ments that imposed conflicting standards of legitimacy and behavior
(Battilana & Lee, 2014; Besharov & Smith, 2014; Jay, 2013; Thornton et al.,
2012). At the time of their founding, green banks were a nascent type of orga-
nization affected by uncertainty in its essential goals and activities and thus in
the definition of the relevant resource environment. The two green banks we
studied thus provided a suitable setting to explore the implications of environ-
mental uncertainty for innovative hybrid organizations.
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The geographical locations of the two banks we studied varied signifi-
cantly in their resource environments. This feature enabled us to observe var-
iation in how the banks’ strategies responded to differing environmental
changes. Establishing the new organization was difficult in both locations,
but the resource environment was especially challenging in the Southern
state. For the purposes of our study, the banking sector also has the attrac-
tive feature the process of starting new banks follows a clear, well-established
sequence of events whereby specific parts of the environment (investors, reg-
ulators, customers, etc.) become especially relevant (Almandoz, 2012). This
feature enabled the comparison between cases at similar stages in each
bank’s development. The time period examined, from 2005 to 2012 (extend-
ing beyond the founding period), offered a good opportunity to observe the
implications of uncertainty stemming from the 2008 economic crisis, some of
which affected industries with which the banks were directly involved. Our
analysis focused on the process and mechanisms by which a strategy was
defined over time to achieve those goals.
This study contributes to the literature on institutions and entrepreneur-
ship by explicitly theorizing the process by which innovative hybrid organi-
zations define their strategic orientations in the face of uncertainty in their
local resource environments. First, our findings suggest that uncertainty
plays a key and nuanced role in entrepreneurial founding as entrepreneurs
search for resources and adapt their strategic orientation to the local avail-
ability of suitable resources. Second, we contribute to research on internal
representation of institutional logics within hybrid organizations (Pache &
Santos, 2010) by exploring how new organizations in complex environ-
ments (Kraatz & Block, 2008) incorporate multiple field-level logics in the
composition of their strategic decision-making teams. Our findings suggest
that, especially among innovative hybrid organizations, the internal repre-
sentation of competing logics may not be an “a priori” factor driving the
process of organizational creation but may be endogenous to this process
and consequential to its outcome.
THEORETICAL CONTEXT
Institutional Uncertainty and Entrepreneurship
Abundant previous research has addressed how institutional influences in
local environments affect organizational forms and practices (DiMaggio &
34 JUAN ALMANDOZ ET AL.
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Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; see also Marquis & Battilana, 2009).
The presence of strong institutional norms can enable new enterprises to
establish their legitimacy by conforming to established conventions and
thus to acquire resources. By contrast, failure to conform to established
conventions can result in an “illegitimacy discount” (Zuckerman, 1999)
that complicates the acquisition of resources, thereby aggravating the legiti-
macy struggles that all new organizations face (Stinchcombe, 1965).
Alignment with institutional expectations is thus critically important for
the viability of new organizations.
Given the importance of institutional environments, uncertainty would
be expected to weigh heavily upon entrepreneurial outcomes. Yet to the
degree that researchers have explored changing environments over time
(Thornton, 2004), studies have focused on drawing linkages between grad-
ual changes in the institutional environment and population-level founding
rates. An advantage of this approach is that in such settings, the link
between institutional change and entrepreneurial opportunities can be
more easily established (see Tolbert, David, & Sine, 2011 for a review of
the literature on how institutions shape entrepreneurial choices). However,
research has yet to fully explore how entrepreneurial organizations develop
their strategic directions contemporaneously with the unfolding of their
institutional environments in real time, and the results of these processes
for these organizations’ strategic orientations. Uncertainty is likely to be a
critical factor for new hybrid organizations that are outside of established
or conventional forms.
Previous research has conceptualized multiple types of uncertainty in
organizational environments. For instance, Milliken (1987) subdivided the
concept of environment uncertainty into three types: uncertainty about the
state of the environment ! addressing for instance the likelihood of
experiencing a crisis or a drop in demand (Adner, 2002); uncertainty about
the degree to which environment changes will have an effect on the organi-
zation (for instance a crisis drying up resource pools for the organization)
(Duncan, 1972; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Tushman & Anderson, 1986);
and, finally, uncertainty about organizational response options and about
the likely consequences of those options (Conrath, 1967; Duncan, 1972;
Taylor, 1984).
Innovative hybrid organizations are likely to experience each of these
types of uncertainty to varying degrees. Hybrid organizations that operate
at the fringes of multiple institutional environments face uncertainty related
to the states of those multiple environments, how they will affect the orga-
nization, and how the hybrid organization might respond. In some respects,
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the institutional plurality of these organizations’ environments, as the orga-
nizations are exposed to a greater diversity of sources of risk. However,
hybrids may also have broader options to respond to uncertainty in one
institutional domain, including shifting their strategic orientation to align
with another institutional domain. In such circumstances, shifting the stra-
tegic orientation of the organization may be a way to deal with environ-
mental uncertainty.
Previous research has argued that institutional change ! for instance,
the historical transition of the banking industry from a community to an
efficiency logic ! can increase environmental uncertainty and thus affect
the strategies of entrepreneurs. Marquis and Lounsbury (2007) found that
as larger banks acquired community banks ! imposing an efficiency logic
in the local banking sector ! banking entrepreneurs found support to start
new banks that embraced a community logic. Institutional changes can
give rise to new organizational forms by making resources available to
entrepreneurs who are skillful at the art of institutional bricolage, defined
as, “importing and exporting cultural symbols and practices from one insti-
tutional order to another” (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, p. 115), or at mobi-
lizing actors invested in the success of a particular institutionalization
project (DiMaggio, 1991).
One of the most central ways that emerging organizations manage uncer-
tainty is through the composition of their founding board of directors or
strategic decision-making team (Boyd, 1990). For example, scholars have dis-
covered that when environments are uncertain, more interlocks among board
members are expected to secure access to information from multiple sources
(Boyd, 1990; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). New organizations in those uncertain
environments are likely to have more hierarchy and more focus on discipline
and authority (Pfeffer & Leblebici, 1973) and they may actively manage their
stakeholders (Ansoff, 1965; Emshoff & Freeman, 1981; Mason & Mitroff,
1981) to energize and channel specific interest groups that are critical to the
organization’s functioning. By creating a “negotiated environment” (Cyert &
March, 1963), these organizations can guard against external threats that
might have de-legitimating or destabilizing effects.
Senior Leadership Teams in Hybrid Organizations
Senior leaders of hybrid organizations face the distinctive challenge of skill-
fully managing the expectations and demands of diverse organizational
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stakeholders (Johnson, 2007). Organizations attempting to create new orga-
nizational forms assert a set of core features that differs from that of existing
forms (Navis & Glynn, 2010), and thus face the challenge of incompatibility
with the institutional rules dominant in existing fields (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994).
While founders may possess clear visions for their organizations, the realiza-
tion of their plans is conditional on the approval of powerful actors in the
new organization’s environment. To gain this approval, senior leaders of
hybrid organizations must successfully develop resource exchange relation-
ships with key stakeholders ! such as suppliers, distributors, financiers, and
customers ! who themselves are typically embedded in the institutional
logics from which the new venture diverges (Loewenstein, Ocasio, & Jones,
2012; Pache & Santos, 2010; Thornton et al., 2012).
As senior leadership is responsible for the acquisition of all other organiza-
tional resources, the senior leadership team is arguably the most essential
resource acquired by the emergent organization. Hybrid organizations recruit
senior leaders whose identities, values, and assumptions correspond to the
dominant logics of powerful stakeholders (Almandoz, 2012, 2014; Pache &
Santos, 2010). Studies of organizations that defy dominant organizational
forms increasingly emphasize the extent to which they navigate multiple logics
in the acquisition, and retention, of key resources. Senior leadership teams in
which multiple logics are represented enable such organizations to simulta-
neously address competing standards of legitimacy and behavior (Ashforth &
Reingen, 2014; Battilana & Lee, 2014; Jay, 2013; Pache & Santos, 2010).
As a result, hybrid organizations face external pressures to compose a
strategic decision-making team that represents the dominant logics in their
environments (Almandoz, 2012, 2014; Pache & Santos, 2010). These pres-
sures are likely to have significant effects in hybrid organizations, which
lack the enabling effects of conformity to established institutional norms.
Once selected, senior leaders represent the logics they carry within the orga-
nization, and thus act as a channel for institutional influence on decision-
making. The presence and distribution of this representation is likely to
shape the organization’s strategic direction (Besharov & Smith, 2014;
Pache & Santos, 2010).
Strategic Orientation
Organizations can respond to conflicting institutional demands in multi-
ple ways. Pache and Santos (2010) mapped a range of possible organiza-
tional responses ! including strategies such as compromise, avoidance,
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defiance, and manipulation ! depending in part on the degree to which
the multiple demands are internally represented within the organization,
and on whether the conflict among logics is with respect to means or
ends. While the distinction between means and ends may not always be
obvious, and the two may in fact overlap (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Pache
& Santos, 2010) in environments influenced by multiple logics, there may
be variations over time, and across organizations, in how dominant one
institutional logic is with respect to the other as, for example, in the
degree to which the goals inherent to the banking logic, such as profit-
ability or growth, take priority over social considerations grounded in a
green logic.
The strategic orientation of a hybrid organization can be defined as the
degree to which the goals of one institutional logic are dominant over the
goals of another. In principle, such orientation is likely to be revealed not
when the goals derived from both logics are compatible and synergistic but
when tradeoffs are encountered and choices are made, including the choice to
invite to the board of directors a key resource provider who could conceivably
weigh in later on the direction of the organization. An organization’s strategic
orientation in response to competing institutional demands (Delmas & Toffel,
2008) is expressed in policies, strategic statements, and business plans and is
interpreted and enacted by various organizational members promoting
specific values, goals, and interests (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996).
CONTEXT OF THE STUDY
The Rise of a Green Institutional Logic
The creation of the first green banks in the United States followed a
period of dramatic growth in public concern about the state of the natu-
ral environment. In 2005, Al Gore’s documentary on global warming,
“An Inconvenient Truth,” attracted widespread media attention and was
instrumental in his later being awarded, with others, the Nobel Peace
Prize. The year 2005 was also the year that the Kyoto Protocol, an inter-
national treaty setting obligations on countries to reduce emissions of
greenhouse gases, entered into force. Geopolitical instability, particularly
in the Middle East, had dramatically increased oil prices, causing investor
and entrepreneur attention to shift toward renewable sources of energy.
All these events contributed, in many fields, to the emergence of a green
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logic organized around products and services related to sustainability and
renewable energy. For instance, growing trends in the construction and food
industries favored green products, such as green buildings and organic-food
products. According to a 2005 study of the National Association of Home
Builders, 90 percent of U.S. home-builders were using “green” ideas. The
organic-food industry had reached $30 billion globally in 2005, and Whole
Foods Supermarkets, the best-known retail firm in this sector, increased
sales by 23 percent to $3.9 billion in 2005. Importing a green logic into bank-
ing was part of a broader Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) trend.
According to a 2005 report, SRI assets in USA grew from $639 billion in
1995 to $2.29 trillion in 2005, encompassing then nearly 10 percent of all
assets under professional management. In Europe, banks including Triodos
and Credit Agricole had adopted a green mission, but there was still no such
precedent among for-profit banks in the United States.
A banking institutional logic in the context of local banks (Almandoz,
2012, 2014; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007) defines the legitimate meanings,
expectations, and practices that govern this setting. In the context of new
banks, this banking logic implies a relationship-centered service and reli-
ance on the social and business networks of founding and management
teams for referrals to investor capital, deposits and loans. This banking
logic also involves rapid growth, a profit expectation, and an investment
motivation because to some degree all new banks are “built to sell” ! that
is, started as investments (Almandoz, 2012, 2014).
Green banks sought to combine the green and banking logics in order to
establish and legitimate a new organizational form. Because these organiza-
tions would depend on resources motivated by both logics, but would
diverge substantially from both, such a combination risked legitimacy chal-
lenges and conflict between their respective rules and expectations.
Decision-making teams in these green banks would need to both be atten-
tive to pressures from their local banking environments and consistent with
a green strategic orientation, however defined.
METHODS
Data Collection
One of the authors has previously conducted extensive research on tradi-
tional bank founding teams, collecting 76 interviews from CEOs, directors,
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bank employees, consultants, and regulators. This prior research provided
an in-depth perspective on the bank founding experience, which illumi-
nated the context of the founding of the two green banks. The similarity
of each founding team’s vision for building a green bank was especially
clear in that wider context. Two of the coauthors were involved in visits
to these two green banks and collected a total of 33 additional interviews,
developing two teaching cases in the process. We first approached and
interviewed the CEOs of both organizations, who were subsequently
instrumental in facilitating broad access to board directors, bank execu-
tives, owners, clients, lawyers, and regulators. The structure of each inter-
view followed a semi-structured interview protocol (Strauss & Corbin,
1998). The preliminary questions addressed the idea of starting a green
bank, the formation of the founding team, challenges in opening, evolu-
tion of the bank’s green strategy, how the interview participant became
involved with the bank, and how the green strategic orientation was
received in the local area. Interviews ranged from 45 minutes to 2 hours,
averaging around 1 hour. Almost all interviews were audiotaped and tran-
scribed. The numbers of interviews by organization level are summarized
in Table 1.
To supplement these interviews, we collected and analyzed extensive
archival data, including documents presented by the bank to investors and
other stakeholders, press releases, media coverage, web sites of both organi-
zations, documents submitted to regulators for bank charter approval
(specifying the business plan of the bank and the objectives and qualifica-
tions of founders and bank managers) and documents issued by regulators
regarding the banks. Finally, we also analyzed bank portfolio and perfor-
mance data.
Table 1. Interview Summary.
GREENWEST GREENSOUTH
CEO 4 5
Other directors 2 6
Clients 1 3
Bankers 9 2
Lawyer and consultant 1
Total 16 17
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Data Analysis
We approached the data with the goal of understanding how
GREENWEST and GREENSOUTH arrived at very different strategic
orientations despite the similar visions espoused by their founders at the
time of founding. Several years after its founding, GREENWEST had
adopted a policy of refusing to lend to companies with no commitment to
sustainability. GREENSOUTH, by contrast, maintained a more open lend-
ing policy, channeling its green mission through a more visible, media-ori-
ented strategy that emphasized its green headquarters building and its own
sustainable practices, such as trying to minimize the use of paper. At first
glance, differences in the receptiveness of each bank’s geographic location
to environmentally oriented ideas appeared to be decisive in the ultimate
definition of their green strategies. However, further analysis revealed addi-
tional nuances that were important to explain the evolution of the two
banks’ strategic orientations.
The analysis prompted a dialogue (Eisenhardt, 1989; Ragin, 1994)
between the data documenting influences on the green strategies and theo-
ries about internal representation of institutional logics in hybrid organiza-
tions and about how such organizations respond to institutional forces
(Pache & Santos, 2010, 2013). A first step in the analysis involved exploring
the priorities at each stage and coding accordingly, using Atlas.ti, the
sources of institutional pressures and the resulting influences on the bank’s
strategy. Initially, we focused on a small set of interviews (with the current
CEOs of both organizations and the chairman of one) to analyze lines with
open codes related to the “generation of the idea,” the “mission,” “assem-
bling a founding team and board,” dealing with “regulators,” “investors,”
and “employees” as well as anticipating and responding to local market
conditions.
For example, from one of the CEO’s interviews the “generation of the
idea” was coded as a “joint passion” for both business and the environ-
ment, a deeply-felt “opposition” to the right-wing banking culture, and a
“conversation with a friend” while jogging at a forest. The stage involving
“regulators” included codes on getting “expert help” from a prestigious
bank lawyer and compiling a detailed “application and a business plan.”
Influences arising from interactions with regulators included “surprise” as
regulators presented more difficulties than anticipated. As the CEO put it,
“I thought wrongfully that with this sustainability initiative, I would get my
charter easier.” Another code arising from those interactions was “push-
back” as regulators questioned the viability of the business plan and as
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they proposed additional scrutiny by making the bank a “niche” bank. As
a result of that resistance, the “mission” veered toward the banking logic
(becoming a traditional bank) and away from an integrated green mission.
As the CEO admitted to saying to regulators, “If somebody comes in and
they want to do a five-acre slash and burn development, we’re still going to
do it because we have shareholder value to maintain.” A shift toward the
banking logic was also evidenced by “resistance” from shareholders and a
“lack of local interest” in sustainability because of the “crisis.”
After the initial set of interviews was coded by one of the authors, we
compared the two cases, searching for similarities and contrasts. At this
stage, we noted that both banks’ strategic orientations appeared to be
driven by common mechanisms involving the initial idea and interactions
with board members, regulators, investors, employees, and the local mar-
ket. The strategic orientations of the two banks depended heavily on the
composition of their senior leadership, whose selection and retention was
determined by the demands of other external resource providers. Members
of the banks’ senior leadership teams were conscious of and responsive to
shifts in how each bank understood its resource environment. In general,
these patterns suggested that the banks were adapting simultaneously to
the requirements of the more critical internal and external resource provi-
ders (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Evidence suggested that, whenever possible,
resource providers were selected on the basis of fit with the strategic orien-
tation at the time of their selection and the availability of talent aligned
with that strategic orientation. For instance, in the interview described
above, the CEO mentioned selecting board members initially on the basis
of their alignment with the green mission. Some of the previous partners in
a previous bank board were excluded (to their irritation) because they were
“right-wing nuts” and the CEO wanted no “pushback” in his senior leader-
ship team. When selection based on fit was not possible, congruence
between the strategic orientation and the various resource providers was
achieved by adapting the strategic orientation, which in turn led in some
cases to the restructuring of some of the internal and external resource pro-
viders of the bank. Thus, when regulators, investors, and the market
“pushed back,” the bank adjusted its strategic orientation in favor of the
banking logic.
The final step of the analysis was to confirm our preliminary findings in
the larger set of interviews and in the archival evidence of the bank’s strate-
gic priorities. The theoretical lens developed through the evolution of the
bank until its establishment was confirmed further when, by using that lens,
we successfully made sense of the re-founding of GREENWEST based on a
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green reorientation. In support of this confirmatory analysis, we used
ATLAS.ti searches for keywords including “adapt,” “change,” “strategy,”
“mission,” “idea,” “investor,” and “profit” to ensure that we had not missed
alternative explanations for the evolution of the strategic orientation.
HYBRID ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN UNCERTAIN
AND FLUCTUATING ENVIRONMENTS
GREENWEST and GREENSOUTH, our two research sites, were founded
two years apart and were among the first green banks to be established in
the United States. Both banks sought to establish the new form of green
banking, to be comprised of organizations engaged in banking activities
that aimed to both advance the cause of sustainability and make a financial
profit. The visions of the early members of the senior leadership teams of
the two organizations were remarkably similar. One cofounder of
GREENWEST called himself an “innovative banker” whose goal was to
get “exceptional returns.” Another cofounder stated that GREENWEST
bank would be the first to focus on both “banking” and the promotion of
“green and sustainable resources.” Similarly, the founder/CEO of
GREENSOUTH called himself “a rabid environmentalist” but also “a
rabid capitalist.” In both cases, founders and directors aspired to make a
real impact on the environment and were excited about how their “business
model” had the potential to “define the future of the U.S. banking
industry.”
These “green” privately owned banks should not be confused with “state
green banks,” other governmental state-level financial institutions that
emerged later to provide low-cost financial services for clean or renewable
energy projects. The first among those other institutions was Connecticut’s
Clean Energy Finance and Investment Authority (CEFIA), established in
2011 to leverage millions of federal funding in support of state-level clean
energy initiatives. Unlike those government institutions, GREENWEST and
GREENSOUTH were “regular” privately owned local community banks.
The founding process of GREENWEST and GREENSOUTH followed
a startup process consisting of steps that are typical to the founding of a
new bank. There are four sequential steps that correspond to the acquisition
of critical tangible and intangible resources: (1) assembling a core founding
group of directors with appropriate connections, legitimacy and skills; (2)
obtaining regulatory approvals; (3) securing capital resources; and (4) facing
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the market for both employees and customers. This process is well-
established and was closely followed by more than 100 new community
banks per year in the years preceding our study (Almandoz, 2012). There is
a “ready-to-wear” model (Battilana & Dorado, 2010), a well-defined forma-
tion process, and eager support from bank regulators, consultants and law-
yers (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) to assist founders in this endeavor.
GREENWEST’s Founding Process
The timeline of GREENWEST’s founding is summarized in Table 2 from
assembling a core founding group of directors (2003!2004), to obtaining
regulatory approvals (2005), securing capital resources (2004!2006), and
facing the market for employees and customers (2006!2007). Each of these
steps entailed an encounter with GREENWEST’s resource environment,
with resulting consequences for the composition of its senior leadership
and strategic orientation.
Local Context and Founding Group
GREENWEST was established in a region of the United States that one
executive referred to as “the Mecca of all things green.” In an organiza-
tional document explaining its initial strategy, GREENWEST specified
that the area was chosen because of “the critical mass of clean businesses
and sustainability focused organizations in the region” (page 2). The
15-page executive summary of the document provides abundant detail on
the bank’s strategy to target green businesses, and people and organizations
committed to sustainability. Ten different sectors are mentioned as poten-
tial clients of the bank ! including organically and sustainably produced
food, green buildings and green consumer products. Specific examples are
mentioned of potential customers and their banking needs. The document
lists 16 sample industry associations or cooperative organizations with
whom the bank could partner and mentions that board members and orga-
nizers of the bank have existing relationships with 539 different organiza-
tions in the bank’s home region alone: 178 in clean energy, 184 in organic
foods, and 177 in green buildings.
GREENWEST’s founding group was deeply embedded in green institu-
tions, locally, nationally, and internationally, and included a broad base of
directors with a strong commitment to, and affinity for, both financial and
green logics, including renowned green activists and businesspeople. One of
the bank founders had, years before, been instrumental in persuading large
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institutional investors in the region to invest in green enterprises. Others in
the core group of founders had created organizations and investment funds
to promote green entrepreneurship. The cofounders then hired a CEO to
run the bank. (see Table 3 describing the backgrounds of board directors
and organizers of the bank).
Interactions with Resource Environment
In its initial stages of development, the essential resources acquired by
GREENWEST were largely controlled by actors embedded in the green
logic. However, despite the strong green orientation of the core founding
group of directors, GREENWEST’s strategic orientation became progres-
sively more banking-oriented and less green. As one founding director
explained, this shift to a banking orientation was heavily influenced by a
decision to hire a CEO who was a seasoned banker, but did not have a
strong commitment to sustainability. While the ideal candidate would have
demonstrated operating experience within both the banking logic and the
green logic, such a candidate proved impossible to find. The hire of a bank-
ing oriented CEO reinforced the banking logic, shifting the balance of
representation of banking and green logics within senior leadership. (see
Table 4 for detailed evidence about this period).
GREENWEST’s move toward the banking logic continued once it
commenced operations. GREENWEST’s initial business plan, approved
by regulators, projected a loan portfolio comprised of 50 percent real
estate loans. Relative to loans made to clients in other sectors, these
loans were typically not viewed as enacting the green logic, as
GREENWEST borrowers rarely committed to build according to
sustainable standards. However, growth in the local real estate market
during the initial years of GREENWEST’s existence shifted available
Table 3. Core Founding Group’s Involvement in Sustainability at
GREENWEST.
• Cofounder of a group of business leaders advocating environmental goals
• CEO of a social finance nonprofit focused on environmental sustainability
• President of an organic and sustainable food product consulting firm and former president
of the Organic Trade Association
• President of a leading green building and energy efficiency company
• Partner of venture capital fund focused on clean technology investments
• President of a building and engineering firm focused on green and sustainable buildings
• Director of a major private foundation with a strong focus on environmental sustainability
• Director of an investment banking firm with a specialization in clean energy
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Table 4. Illustrations of the Impact of Resource Environment on
GREENWEST.
The idea and
building a board
(2003!2004)
The market was ideal for a new bank that could potentially make a
difference in the banking sector.
Founding member. We saw the need. There is a need to be a successful
business in order to grow and generate resources to make a difference
in the environment.
Employee. I saw the opportunity to be on the cusp of something new,
different and enduring. We would like that in 10 years everyone will
be wondering, “Why weren’t we always banking like this?”
Press release. We are the bank for people leading the way to a more
sustainable world. We are a mission driven bank focused on
sustainability; that means we work to have positive environmental
and social impact, as well as make a profit, and we support businesses
that do the same.
Business Plan. The bank’s market [in the area], which is underserved
by commercial banks currently operating in the local market and is
also home to a thriving and highly connected network of rapidly
growing clean businesses and leading sustainability focused
organizations.
Regulators (2005) Regulators pushed the bank to give more priority to banking goals
and less to green goals
Founding member. I think the regulators focus on risks, and not
necessarily on the other issues that need to be addressed in society. So
an idea that is new is sometimes challenging. If you focus on green
business you are going to be too concentrated from a risk standpoint.
So, [regulators] actually had a lot of input initially into how we
evolved the business model. They were definitely the hardest ones to
please. They actually said, “We want you to act as a community bank
and serve the rest of the community as well.” That’s what they
required us to do.
Second CEO. While the idea of a green bank was highly important to
the bank founders, the bank opened as a more general community
bank that had a focus on green. There was a lack of clarity up front
about what the green strategy was going to be.
Investors
(2004!2006)
Investors focused the bank on banking goals
Second CEO. There were two kinds of investors. The ‘fast banking’
investor was asking how fast can you grow? How high can your ROE
be and how big an exit can we achieve by selling this bank in 10
years? And then there were ‘slow banking’ investors, who were in this
for the long run and not looking for an exit strategy.
The market
(2006!2007)
The market opened attractive opportunities for banking goals
Second CEO. I would say that in the end the idea was never really
clearly laid out. What did success look like? In the end, there were
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definitely competing goals [in the board]. The bank was formed to be
green, but we wanted to grow as fast as we could and that means we
could do a lot of non-green stuff in the interest of growth.
Second chairman. When we were looking to hire a CEO it was hard.
We couldn’t find any seasoned banker who was really interested in
the mission. I could tell immediately that they were “Yeah, yeah,
yeah, we are happy to do this green stuff,” but it was more like icing
on the cake. You could just feel that they were not going to build a
different kind of culture in the organization.
Second chairman. We grew really, really quick and probably we made
some mistakes in the early days by feeling that we needed to get to
profitability very quickly, and therefore put a lot of loans on the
books. So the bank got ahead of itself….[At the end of the run, some
founders] “were shocked that an important part of lending we were
doing was not mission related.”
Employee. Dollar signs and growth were more important than truly
adhering to the [green] mission.
Market Crash (2008) The market crash shrinks the resource environment and returns the
bank to the original green mission for which there are still available
pools of resources
Second CEO. It is not about building for exit multiples. Growth and
profitability are essential and important, but they are means-goals
and not end-goals. The end-goal has to be building a sustainable
community.
Search for new
investor capital
(2008!2011)
The reinforced green strategy of the bank limiting profit expectations
changes the investor composition
Second CEO. Some investors actually love what we are doing and a
lot of them are doubling down. One 10-percent investor is going to
become a 25-percent investor and a 1-percent is going to become a
10-percent investor. So we have some significant increases from
existing investors as a result of this greater mission clarity. But there
are others who are unhappy so I am connecting them with our
market-maker and they want out. So there will be some shifting
among those investors.
A more difficult
regulatory
environment
(2008!2015)
Increasing regulatory oversight limiting growth
Second CEO. Our IRR will get up to 10 percent and that’s probably
the new normal for community banking
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opportunities toward real estate. Although unanticipated, the board and
management viewed the boom in real estate lending opportunities as the
most promising opportunity to grow quickly and most profitably. As a
result, GREENWEST’s proportion of real estate loans as a part of the
overall portfolio was 65, 82, and 88 percent at the end of the first, second,
and third years, respectively. So while the bank had opportunities to
make loans to green customers, the growing attractiveness of the local
real estate resulted in practices more consistent with the banking logic,
especially the goal of rapid bank growth, and less consistent with the
green logic. Thus the bank slowly drifted away from the green strategic
orientation.
GREENWEST’s rapid growth was interrupted suddenly by the market
crash in 2008, which caused the market for real estate loans to plummet.
The result was a much less attractive real estate market and a dramatic
turnover in the board of directors and executive team. As a member of the
founding team and board mentioned, “The chairman of the board resigned
and we really needed to make some changes with the management. So we
basically reconstituted the board and hired a new CEO.” As it attempted
to shift its strategy away from its failed real estate loans, the bank required
new financing. During this period, it discovered that investment capital was
only available within the green investing community, whose normative
motivations for providing financing had persisted despite the crisis. The
bank’s strategic orientation thus shifted back toward the green logic. This
shift to the green logic and away from the banking logic was reinforced
again when the regulatory environment after the crisis (2008!2011)
resulted in more stringent regulatory constraints on banks’ growth and
profitability targets. This shift in the strategic orientation of the bank was
also accompanied by significant turnover in the senior leadership of the
bank that resulted in a greater proportion of members representing the
green logic.
In summary, GREENWEST was founded with a strong green orienta-
tion that progressively weakened through the course of the founding pro-
cess as it was forced to seek resources from the banking sector and as it
was tempted by opportunities for growth. But shifts in the resource envi-
ronment as a result of the crisis led to a refocusing of the bank’s strategic
orientation on green products and customers, which also corresponded to
a re-shuffling of the bank’s investors and organizational members toward
those motivated by the bank’s green orientation. Table 4 shows qualita-
tive evidence from interviews and archival data that supports the story
of how uncertain and fluctuating resource environments determined the
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composition of the decision-making team and the orientation of the
bank’s strategy.
GREENSOUTH’s Founding Process
The timeline of GREENSOUTH’s founding is summarized in Table 5 from
assembling a core founding group of directors (2006!2008), to obtaining
regulatory approvals (2008), securing capital resources (2007!2008) and
facing the market for employees and customers (2007!2009).
Local Context and Founding Group
GREENSOUTH began the process of opening a green bank one year after
the founding of GREENWEST. In stark contrast to the Western state, the
Southern state was viewed by some GREENSOUTH executives as “the
land of the Neanderthal when it comes to sustainability,” In a standard
document describing the bank’s strategy, GREENSOUTH provides far
fewer details than GREENWEST regarding local connections with green
organizations beyond the commitment and personal involvement of three
board directors. One of them is an “internationally known spokesperson”
for the environment; another is actively involved in 16 green associations,
some local, some national, and some international; and the third, the main
founder and CEO, has served as chairman for a political action committee
advancing a green cause. Reflecting a perception that the bank’s focus on
the sustainability would not be appreciated by regulators, GREENSOUTH
does not emphasize its green mission in that official document.
Prior to founding GREENSOUTH, its CEO and founder had exten-
sive experience as a banker. Confident because of his prior success in
founding another bank, and inspired by the story of the founder of
Patagonia, a prominent sustainable apparel company, he decided to start
a values-driven bank that would combine his passions for banking and
the environment. Based on these influences, he saw an opportunity to pair
his professional skills and personal passions by launching a green bank in
a region where he was born and had always lived. He hand-picked a core
founding group from among friends and family and from business
partners, some of whom had been directors of his prior bank’s board of
directors. (See Table 6 describing the backgrounds on sustainability of
board directors).
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Interactions with Resource Environment
Subsequent encounters with the resource environment had implications for
the composition of the strategic decision-making team and the strategic ori-
entation of the bank, which made the bank progressively more focused on
its banking orientation. During the regulatory approval process, state
banking regulators strongly suggested that the green logic should not be
the main focus of the bank. Although the Founder/CEO sought investors
oriented toward green issues, he was unable to find many such investors,
and the bank took capital from investors who viewed the bank primarily as
an opportunity to pursue financial returns. The unavailability of green
investors became even more pronounced as the financial crisis deepened.
Initially the founding group was aiming to require a minimum $100,000
investment per person but financial volatility led them to drop this mini-
mum required investment to $60,000. An initial premise of
GREENSOUTH’s strategy had been to use banking relationships as a way
to encourage clients to make sustainability-oriented investments (i.e., in
energy-efficient buildings); however, the crisis also limited the feasibility of
such investments for GREENSOUTH’s clients.
Following the crisis, GREENSOUTH continued to pursue green opportu-
nities, but primarily inside the organization. Opportunities to make loans to
green companies and industries remained sparse, so the Founder/CEO focused
on alternative means to advance the cause of sustainability. For instance,
GREENSOUTH designed their internal operations to focus on sustainable
principles such as operating without physical paper. GREENSOUTH also
sought to use the bank as a platform for sustainability by drawing media atten-
tion to its sustainability mission.
Table 7 shows qualitative support for the evolution of GREENSOUTH’s
strategic orientation as a result of an increasingly difficult resource environ-
ment forcing the bank to focus more on its banking orientation. Unlike the
example of GREENWEST’s process of formation, there were no
Table 6. Core Founding Group’s Involvement in Sustainability at
GREENSOUTH.
• The CEO is Chairman of a political action committee to purchase and preserve public land.
• A respected pastor, leader in a large evangelical community who has been named one of the
top 15 religious environmental leaders worldwide.
• A biologist and entrepreneur who started a local tissue laboratory and nursery specializing
in the production of indoor tropicals and fruits and who is involved in national and
international plant, foliage, nursery, and horticulture societies.
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Table 7. Illustrations of the Impact of Resource Environment on
GREENSOUTH.
The idea and building a
board (2006)
A committed environmentalist and successful banker wants to make
a difference in a territory that is not keen on sustainability
Founder. I am a committed environmentalist, and I love banking. A
rabid environmentalist and a rabid capitalist. So I was running with
a friend, and we talked about it, and he said, “It’s your destiny.
You need to merge the two things.” That’s the genesis of it.
Founder. There were a handful of key people [on my previous bank
board] that I wanted to have on the board who would be
understanding and supportive of sustainability and there were
plenty of others who would have liked to join me, and in fact some
of them, once they found out, came to me and were irritated when I
did not invite them, but I didn’t want anybody pushing back
Executive. “This is the land of Neanderthals when it comes to
sustainability.”
Executive. We are very excited about this business model, and we
believe it will define the future of the U.S. banking industry. To my
knowledge, this will be the first bank of its kind to promote positive
environmental and social responsibility while providing for
increased profits for investors and clients.
Regulators (2007) Regulators and consultants pushed the bank to give more priority
to banking goals and less to green goals
Founder. Regulators wanted to put us into the niche bank category
[a bank serving a specialized and undiversified sector] and all our
consultants and advisors said, “You don’t want to do that.” So, we
said, “No, we are a community bank. We are not a niche bank.” I
am not sure that was the right decision in the end, because we ended
up having to straddle between what is seen as traditional
community banking and what we were really doing in terms of our
mission.
Founder. At that point, I said, “Whoa, whoa, whoa! We’re a bank,
we’re a bank, we’re a bank! If somebody comes in and they want to
do a 5-acre slash-and-burn real estate development deal, we’re still
going to do it because we have shareholder value to maintain. We’re
going to try everything we can to teach them a better way, but we’re
still going to do it. We won’t want to do it and we will kick and
scream the whole time.” So finally I got them to back off.
Investors (2007!2008) Investors had different motivations in mind when they joined the
bank
Founder. [Reported that an investor who agreed to invest $500,000
in the bank said]: “I don’t believe in this [green] stuff, but yours is
the best marketing ploy I have ever seen.”
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fluctuations in the relative abundance of resources aligned with the green
and banking logics; there was only of a steady decline in both banking and
green available resources.
Long-Term Strategic Orientation
These two organizations, despite the similar intentions of their founders,
ended up with significant differences in the degree to which goals connected
with the green and banking institutional logics were realized in their
strategies.
GREENWEST
GREENWEST emerged from the financial crisis operating with a strong
green logic, despite its shift toward the banking logic prior to the crisis.
The green strategy at GREENWEST focused on three aspects of its strat-
egy. First, the bank committed to focusing client acquisition on companies
already committed to sustainability, either because their business was in a
The market crash
(2008!2009)
The market in this Southern market is less “green” than anticipated
because of the crisis
Founder. Initially, the emphasis on sustainability went very well. But
as things began to change all that became almost a non-issue.
Nobody wanted to hear it; no one wanted to talk about it, which
was really disturbing to me, because that was the genesis of the
whole idea.
Founder. We opened at the peak of the great recession and nobody,
absolutely nobody, has any interest in doing anything sustainable.
People are having trouble and when they do they just want to be
able to meet their mortgage payment, they don’t care about green.
A more difficult
regulatory environment
(2008!2015)
New banks receive more regulatory oversight, preventing rapid
growth and encouraging safety and causing a renovated emphasis
on the green mission
Employee. I think it’s better for the bank to be here [rather than in
the local environment of GREENWEST] because it has a chance to
be the leader whereas GREENWEST may just be one of [many
organizations] in [that area] doing this. Here GREENSOUTH has a
chance to be on the leading edge to help promote what it feels
strong about. It stands out more here. [So] in order to grow a
movement this is a better place to do it.
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green or sustainable sector, or because they made a clear commitment to
operate in a sustainable fashion. As a consequence of its client selection,
GREENWEST pursued modest growth and limited its own potential for
profitability. Clients would be asked to take a survey every year and, based
on the survey, they would be classified as either “learners,” “achievers,”
“leaders,” or “champions.” The bank also developed toolkits with green
recommendations and resources.
Second, bankers were trained to become trusted advisors on sustainable
practices. The strategy involved helping clients become more environmen-
tally sustainable and developing to that end a green expertise so that
GREENWEST’s bankers could become trusted advisors, especially adept
at helping customers “unlock the economic value of sustainability” through
branding and marketing practices, hiring and retaining employees, cost sav-
ings, and access to meaningful networks of similarly committed organiza-
tions and individuals.
Third, the renewed alignment with the green strategy entailed presenting
a quarterly sustainability report to the board of directors, including aggre-
gate scores on sustainability. The board also planned to review the bank’s
progress each year in fulfilling its green mission. To commit even more
explicitly as a matter of governance to the green strategic orientation, the
bank chose to become a B Corporation, joining other hybrid companies
with both profit and nonprofit goals. Even though becoming a B
Corporation currently had no legal consequence in the GREENWEST’s
home state, it was a way to signal the organization’s commitment to a triple
bottom line (return to shareholders, to employees, and to the environment).
Bank investors were thus forewarned that maximizing value to share-
holders was not the bank’s sole purpose or even its central purpose.
GREENSOUTH
GREENSOUTH did not commit itself to serving only customers committed
to green causes, finding insufficient demand for green banking services, nor
to make its bankers experts in sustainability. It also did not establish gover-
nance practices to measure the degree to which the bank was serving a green
mission. GREENSOUTH’s strategic orientation was instead focused on
internal operations rather than in its relationships with external stakeholders.
First, they built a landmark headquarters building that received platinum
LEED certification ! the highest level. Living out their mission in the “land
of the Neanderthals,” where green concerns were not legitimate involved,
attracting considerable media attention. GREENSOUTH’s building served
that purpose: it was built partly from recycled materials and had electric
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vehicle charging stations, larger windows to receive natural lighting, solar
roof panels, and multiple other green and sustainable features.
Second, the bank operated sustainably, in a largely paperless fashion,
and offered incentives to employees and customers who made investments
in products and services aligned with green causes, such as purchasing
energy-efficient cars, and remodeling homes to improve energy efficiency.
Because of the crisis and the lack of local interest in sustainability, less than
10 percent out of $138 million in the loan portfolio four years after estab-
lishment was composed of green loans, including loans to construction,
landscaping, farming, nursery, organic foods, solar energy, medical, and
water distribution companies. Green deposits comprised less than two per-
cent out of $171 million as of that time.
In sum, compared to that of GREENWEST, GREENSOUTH empha-
sized the green logic primarily through internal practices and its public
example, rather than through monitoring the green practices of its clients.
The green mission was promoted in the bank through personal influence,
mostly that of the CEO. Some bankers told stories about the bank’s
impact, one person at a time, leading to more hybrid cars purchased, and
incandescent light bulbs being replaced by florescent or low-voltage bulbs.
As one banker put it, “You can tell that you are having an impact and
making a difference when a client tells you, without you asking, about a
new sustainable practice he or she is following.”
DISCUSSION
Our findings suggest that innovative hybrid ventures face complex and
uncertain resource environments and that this uncertainty plays an impor-
tant and nuanced role in shaping the strategy of the organization. In partic-
ular, we find that the two banks’ strategies emerged through an interactive
process of searching for alignment among the uncertain local resource envi-
ronment, the composition of the senior leadership team, and the strategic
orientation of the bank.
For the two green banks we studied, the search for alignment between
these elements began early in the founding process, before the banks were
operational. During the process of regulatory approval and initial invest-
ment, both banks experienced interactions with regulators and investors
who were more embedded in the banking logic. These initial encounters
with the local environment also shifted the strategic orientations of both
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banks away from the green logic and toward the banking logic. In the case
of GREENWEST, this shift was due to unexpectedly high demand for real
estate products. GREENSOUTH shifted toward the banking logic upon
finding that the local appetite for financial services among sustainability-
oriented clients was unexpectedly low, a pattern exacerbated by the finan-
cial crisis. The financial crisis had a different effect in the Western state,
however, where the resource environment associated with a banking logic
declined as the green bank category become much less appealing to tradi-
tional investors. This increased comparatively the availability of green cli-
ents and investors, pushing GREENWEST to shift back toward the green
logic in its strategic orientation. Green investors, bankers and board direc-
tors rescued the bank by providing or finding access to new resources in
exchange for a more explicit commitment to a green strategic orientation
and to changes in the bank’s board and management teams.
Our analysis revealed the outsized influence of uncertain or unknown
resource environments on the institutional composition of the banks’ senior
leadership. Additions to senior leadership teams have significant influence
on the banks’ strategic orientation, as individuals function as “carriers” of
the logics to which they have previously been exposed (Scott, 1995).
Decisions about executive hiring and board member transitions were made
according to the current strategic orientation of the bank and to the avail-
ability of talent that represented these logics and satisfied other require-
ments for these positions. In some cases, the limited availability of talent
led a bank to select a leader who was not aligned with its current strategic
orientation, such as when GREENWEST hired a CEO who primarily fol-
lowed the banking logic. Despite the commitment of the founding team to
the green logic, it could not find an experienced banker who also possessed
experience in, and commitment to, the green logic. Due to the general con-
tinuity of senior leadership, this moment of transition had a persistent
effect on the banks’ strategic orientation until the leadership changed some
years later.
The changing state of the local environments in the West and the South
is necessary but insufficient to explain their influence on the trajectories of
each bank’s strategic orientation over time. This is because the changing
environments were viewed through the lens of the logics represented by
each bank’s senior leadership. For instance, the drift of GREENWEST
toward the banking logic when the real estate market became especially
attractive required not only environment change, but the presence of a
strong banking perspective within the senior leadership team. Members of
the latest senior leadership team of GREENWEST at the end of the time
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period examined criticized the bank’s “mission drift” during its early life
and the failure of the senior leadership team at that time to maintain the
bank’s green strategic orientation. At every step of the way, choices were
made reflecting the interests and motivations of decision-makers within the
banks. Some of those choices involved incorporating other members into
the decision-making teams, members with their own agendas perhaps align-
ing differently with green and banking institutional logics. It is likely that
factors such as the availability of senior leadership aligned with the current
strategic orientation would have led each bank to a much different strategic
orientation.
Fig. 1 summarizes the relationship between those factors. The environ-
ment provides multiple resources, including people (directors for the board,
bank experts, and customers), money (investment capital and deposits),
local networks, regulatory approvals, etc. The timing when those specific
resources are needed and their availability at that time is likely to shape the
strategic orientation of the bank directly at first (as the bank responds to
environmental demands) and then indirectly (as the senior leadership team
is also shaped by prior institutional pressures from the environment). The
process is gradual and path-dependent since what happens at the early
stages of the process has an impact in successive steps (David, 1994;
Sydow, Georg, and Koch, 2009). Senior leadership teams (starting with the
founder and progressively incorporating other decision-makers) interacted
Based on a strategic orientation a decision-making
team selects resources from the environment.
Selection of a part of the  environment
Senior 
leadership team
t = 0, founder
t = 1, board/ founding team added
t = 2, investors added
t = 3, employees added
Green Banking
Strategic adjustment 
If at the moment when they are needed, resources are 
unavailable or insufficient, the team may need to adjust its 
strategic orientation to fit with environment expectations.
The resource 
environment 
may impose 
requirements 
on the 
composition of 
the decision-
making team
Changes in the decision-making
team to meet expectations from 
resource environment may result 
in shifts in strategic orientation.
Strategic 
orientation
Resource 
environment
Environmental selection
Re-alignment
Fig. 1. Dynamic Relationship between Resource Environment and Strategic
Orientation.
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with resource environments and one step at a time defined the banks’ stra-
tegic orientations.
This article makes three important contributions. First, it contributes to
the literature on organizational emergence in the context of organizations
dependent on multiple and uncertain resource environments. This article
shows a gradual, dynamic and path-dependent interplay between agency
and resource environments that ultimately results in the strategic orienta-
tion emerging from the founding period, which cannot be regarded as truly
finished until the organization opens and has operated for a few years
(DiMaggio, 1988). Founders may have an organizational idea with an
implicit orientation emphasizing one logic over the other, and based on
such orientation, they may select and invite into the core founding group,
and later into the investor and employee group, resource providers who are
aligned with this strategic orientation. But if those leaders are not perfectly
aligned in their motivations, their selection may result in shifts or at least
ambiguity in the organization’s strategic orientation. When founders are
strongly dependent on multiple resource environments to build up an orga-
nization, they may need to relinquish some degree of control over the orga-
nization’s strategic orientation. If those resources are multiple and
uncertain, the direction of the strategic orientation may be less predictable,
with uncertain consequences for the stability and commitment of existing
organizational members.
Perhaps because research on environments has generally focused on
well-defined, predictable environments, the impact of environments on the
emergence of new organizations has been treated with an air of inevitabil-
ity. The more complex setting in this article illustrates that the choices of
founders, and the timing of those choices, could affect the internal compo-
sition of senior leadership teams, the representation of institutional
demands, access to resource environments, and the trajectory of the organi-
zation’s strategic orientation. Our research setting allowed us to view the
founding process as a series of engagements with the external environment,
leading to a cycle of perceived environmental change, adjustment of the
strategic orientation of the organization, and senior leader selection. While
our study focuses on the setting of green banking, the implications of this
model would be the same for other contexts where the influences from
those uncertain and multiple resource environments may be simultaneous
rather than sequential.
Second, this article contributes to research on internal representation of
institutional logics within hybrid organizations (Pache & Santos, 2010).
Much research on entrepreneurship and institutional theory views new
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ventures creating new organizational forms, however illegitimate to the
external environment, as strategic actors with well-defined preferences,
operating in well-defined environments (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Lounsbury
& Glynn, 2001). Our findings challenge this assumption and are suggestive
of mechanisms by which the complexity of external environments manifests
within strategic decision-making teams. In other words, the composition of
strategic decision-making teams is not only an independent variable influ-
encing how the organization interprets environmental stimuli and responds
to institutional pressures, but it is itself an outcome of those stimuli and
pressures. Strategic responses to environmental stimuli and internal repre-
sentation of competing logics (banking and green) within the organization’s
strategic decision-making team are likely to be in a state of constant dia-
logue and mutual influence as the boundaries of the organization expand
to include more strategic decision-makers beyond the founder. This recur-
sive influence has implications for the literature on hybrid organizations
and their strategic responses to competing institutional demands, which has
tended to view strategies as outcomes of internal representation without
exploring the recursive nature of such relationship (Almandoz, 2012;
Pache & Santos, 2010).
Third, this article contributes also to research on founder imprinting
(Marquis & Huang, 2010; Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013). Founder commitment
to green and banking logics was similar in these two organizations. Thus
no large differences in the strategic orientation of these organizations
would be expected based solely on characteristics of founders. This article
shows that the strategic orientation of an organization depends not only on
founder characteristics, but may be seen as an outcome variable of an
endogenous series of senior leader imprints. Founders bring to the organi-
zation an implicit strategic orientation and, based on this initial orienta-
tion, select other senior leaders from the pool of accessible candidates in
their resource environment. Such recruited members may independently
influence the organization’s strategic orientation with their own distinctive
motivations and preferences and the influence may in fact be mutual and
recursive until, at the end of the imprinting process, the organization
emerges with a more defined strategic orientation. This orientation may be
crystallized through aligned expectations, concrete practices and experi-
ences, and governance mechanisms. Future research may consider the pos-
sibility that in the long run, the organization’s mature strategic orientation
governs the internal representation of external logics imported via the selec-
tion of senior leaders.
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This article illustrates the simultaneous influence of three factors on stra-
tegic orientation: internal members of strategic decision-making teams act-
ing as carriers of competing institutional logics; multiple resource
environments that become more relevant at key moments of the founding
process and that may become more available in certain geographic settings;
and exogenous variation in economic and environmental conditions. This
last factor may alter the expectations of organizational members to reach
their specific goals and may affect also the size and accessibility of certain
resource environments. This exogenous variation is likely to alter the nego-
tiation power of members within decision-making teams aligned with dis-
tinct institutional logics. This article shows how the impact of temporal
shocks (Schoar & Zuo, 2011) is transmitted through internal and external
mechanisms to influence which features of the environment get imprinted
upon the organization’s strategic orientation.
Important boundary conditions of this study include the very central
role of regulators in the banking sector, who have a strong hand in shaping
the strategic direction of organizations, and the presence of a powerful,
unexpected environmental change ! the financial crisis of 2008. It is evi-
dent that these strong environmental forces had an important impact on
the strategic orientations of the two ventures we studied, but it is not clear
whether similar effects would be observed in the absence of these condi-
tions. The high degree of environmental uncertainty in this study makes
more visible the mechanisms by which such uncertainty has an important
and nuanced role in influencing the strategy of certain organizations. Such
influence would be less relevant if the institutional context were less uncer-
tain or intrusive, or if the initial idea from the entrepreneurs were less new
and more legitimate according to the logics traditionally governing that
sector, or if the founders had access to more resources without having to
depend as much on the environment’s approbation. Under those condi-
tions, the initial idea would be likely to have more persistent influence on
the ultimate strategy of the new organization. The power of the environ-
ment in this empirical setting is important, however, to shed light on the
mechanisms by which organizational strategy, organizational environment,
and leadership teams mutually influence one another.
Another limitation of the present study is that we do not directly observe
how organizations anticipate and respond to environmental uncertainty a
priori ! before perceptions of the resource environment shifted. The influ-
ence of environmental uncertainty was observed indirectly through the
unexpected resistance from regulators to the green banking model, the
tempting opportunity arising from the growth of the real estate market in
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the West, and the financial crisis which altered the availability of resources.
More research is needed to explore how decision-makers approach environ-
mental uncertainty a priori, before reactions from the environment force
organizations to make adjustments. Future research could build on these
ideas through ethnographic and in-depth interview exploration of innova-
tive hybrid organizations during their founding process.
An study focuses on the impact of institutional forces on the strategies
of organizations. Other non-institutional forces may also cause environ-
mental uncertainty ! new competitors, market or strategic innovation,
etc. ! and could similarly give rise to an ongoing interaction between inter-
nal leadership teams, resource-constrained environments, and dynamic
organizational strategies. More research is needed to explore, in real time,
the mechanisms by which new organizations in those uncertain environ-
ments cope with different sources of uncertainty ! both institutional and
non-institutional. For example, future research might examine how the
composition and diversity of top leadership teams is affected by environ-
mental uncertainty and how and under what conditions the organizational
purpose and resulting operational strategies of an organization become
more focused or more open or ambiguous.
One interesting aspect of the empirical setting is that the products of
green banks are very standardized and general (loans and deposits). This
raises the question of whether the strategic orientation of the bank could
be more flexible as a result of offering stable products that are universally
recognized. As a result of that flexibility the likelihood of new organiza-
tional forms emerging may be higher than in other settings where the pro-
ducts and services offered are not as common or standardized and where
environmental resources may be less forthcoming.
While this article has focused on the emergence of new and novel organi-
zations, some of these same mechanisms driving an interaction between
strategies, decision-makers, and environments could also occur within exist-
ing organizations. Leaders of those organizations could enable or constrain
the alternatives available to organizational actors in a way similar to regu-
lators in the market. The role played by external legitimacy and market
demand in this study could be assumed inside existing organizations also
by how proximate or distant is the proposed divisional strategy from exist-
ing practice and what is the likelihood that it will be opposed by political
forces and other sources of organizational inertia. Organizations introduc-
ing new departments with different business models or strategies ! for
instance, a digital strategy ! may require top leadership teams to bridge
and negotiate new and old business approaches. The initial vision for the
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new digital department and for how it is integrated into a larger company
may need to be adjusted as the division engages with distinct organizational
decision-makers and as the composition of the division’s decision-making
team changes.
More research is needed to understand better under what conditions
organizations introducing novel strategies fraught with uncertainty have
frequent a priori exchanges with the resource environment and under what
conditions the strategy is presented as a fait accompli. Steve Jobs, for
example, was not known for consulting with the market about his new
ideas and products. As he put it, “A lot of times, people don’t know what
they want until you show it to them.”1 Some factors likely to predict a less
frequent exchange with the environment may include the confidence or rep-
utation of an entrepreneur, leadership team, or organization, and the mate-
rial resources they own; the attractiveness or potential of the novel strategy
and the threat of imitation by other competing organizations; and the com-
plexity of the novel strategy. As a result, the relationship between new
forms and their environments may not be fully knowable until it is realized
in action.
NOTE
1. As quoted in BusinessWeek (May 25, 1998).
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